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case made out on the basis of mere negligence. It is quite unlikely that
the rider could secure the same amount of transportation from a rail-
road, taxi, or bus company for the price represented by the gasoline
purchase. Furthermore, it is doubtful, from a practical standpoint, that
the purchase was intended as payment, and even if it were, it is even
more doubtful that it was accepted as such. Both tender and acceptance
are necessary for payment. Haas v. Bates, 15o Ore 592, 47 Pac. (2nd)
243 (1935)- On this view of the situation there is substantial justifica-
tion for the position taken in the principal case on the facts before the
court.
A closer question is presented when a purchase of this kind is
intended and received as payment. An Ohio Appellate Court has held
that this constitutes sufficient consideration to take the case out of the
statute. Beer v. Beer, supra. Yet in spite of the fact that a contract has
been entered into, the act of the driver is influenced more by a spirit of
hospitality than a desire for gain, and it would not be surprising if other
courts in such a situation would treat the rider as a guest rather than a
passenger for hire. ROBIN W. LE'rT
LABOR LAW
THE STATUS OF THE STRIKE FOR A CLOSED SHOP.,
A majority of plaintiff's driver salesmen, members of a Drivers'
Union Local, after unsuccessfully requesting their employer to hire only
union labor, went out on strike. The sole issue involved was the right
to strike for a dosed shop. Plaintiff asked the court for a permanent
injunction against the strikers. Defendant conceded that all intimida-
tion and violence should be enjoined but contended that the injunction
should not extend to peaceful picketing.
Held, that all striking activities including peaceful picketing should
be permanently enjoined. Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bowles et al., 31
Ohio N.P. (N.S.) 425 (Ohio L. Rep. March 12, 1934).
* The following note was previously published in the Ohio Bar for May 7, 1934.
A recheck by Jack Day indicates that the Ohio courts have not since that date passed upon
this subject matter. While the invalidation of the N.I.R.A. has disposed of the principal
case discussed in the note, the issue has taken on a new timeliness in inter-state industry
in view of the similar wording in Sec. 7 of the National Labor Relations Act (29 U.S.C.
157) and the added provision in the same act expressly recognizing a closed shop agree-
ment with labor organizations "not established, maintained, or assisted by any unfair
labor practice." (29 U.S.C. 158(3)). Furthermore, the failure of passage in the recent
Ohio Legislature of Am. H.B. 16, restricting jurisdiction for the issuance of injunctions
in labor disputes, has left the question of the right to enjoin a strike for a closed shop in
intra-state industry just as it was when this note was originally written Ed.
The main issue in this case is whether or not at the present time the
strike for the closed shop is legal in Ohio.
LaFrance Co. v. Electrical Workers, io8 Ohio St. 6i (1923), is
the sole Ohio Supreme Court case in point. The court by this decision
definitely upheld the right of strike for the purpose of the closed shop.
In general terms this holding means that the use of the economic
weapon was sanctioned in Ohio as long as the objective of the strike
was lawful, and as long as the means of carrying forward the strike
were free from violence and intimidation.
If the principal case had been decided on Ohio precedent, clearly
peaceful picketing for the purpose of obtaining a closed shop would not
have been enjoined. The court, however, omits any consideration of
the LaFrance case. It bases its decision squarely on its interpretation of
Sections 7a and 5a of the National Industrial Recovery Act. 15 U.S.
C.A. No. 701-7 12.
These sections follow:
Section 7a: "Every code of fair competition, agreement, and
license, approved, prescribed or issued under this tide shall contain the
following conditions: (i) that employees shall have the right to or-
ganize and bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing, and shall be free from the interference, restraint, or coercion
of employers of labor, or their agents, in the designation of such repre-
sentatives or in self-organization or in other concerted activities for the
purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection;
(2) that no employee and no one seeking employment shall be required
as a condition of employment to join any company union or to refrain
from joining, organizing, or assisting a labor organization of his own
choosing; and (3) that employers shall comply with the maximum
hours of labor, minimum rates of pay, and other conditions of employ-
ment, approved or prescribed by the President."
Section 5a: "Nothing in this Act and no regulation thereunder,
shall prevent an individual from pursuing the vocation of manual labor
and selling or trading the products thereof. * * *"
The court's position is this: These two sections have in effect made
closed shop agreements illegal. This for two reasons. In the first place,
such agreements would force employers to say to individuals, "You
must be a member of the union and be represented by their delegates."
This, in the court's mind, would invade the right of employees to have
representation of their own choosing. In the second place, these agree-
ments would amount to preventing men from pursuing the vocation of
manual labor. Therefore, with the objective of the strike illegalized, the
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strike becomes an unlawful combination without justification. Hence
peaceful picketing because of its wrongful purpose becomes illegal and
enjoinable.
The court quotes two excerpts from public statements of Admin-
istrator Johnson and General Counsel Richberg. These statements and
others which these two gentlemen have made in their interpretation of
Section 7a support the court's interpretation. For they have said at
various times that the selection of majority representatives does not
restrict or qualify in any way the right of minority groups of employees
or of individual employees to deal with their employer.
It would appear, however, that section 7a permits of a second inter-
pretation-an interpretation which does not illegalize closed shops.
This second approach proceeds on the basis that freedom of choice
in the selection of representatives is not given to an individual acting
alone but only to employees composing an organized group. An indi-
vidual does not have any collective bargaining rights which can be inter-
fered with until as a member of a group his freedom of selection is
invaded. Or in the facts of the principal case since the other driver
salesmen of the plaintiff were not organized, Section 7a did not extend
any new rights to them. Hence these other employees do not by this
section receive any right of representation of their own choosing which a
closed shop agreement would invade.
President Roosevelt's public statement at the settlement of the auto
industry labor dispute on March 26th suggests this second interpretation.
"Reduced to plain language Section 7a of N.I.R.A. means (a)
Employees have the right to organize into a group or groups. (b) When
such group or groups are organized they can choose representatives by
free choice and such representative must be received collectively and
thereby seek to straighten out disputes and improve conditions of em-
ployment. (c) Discrimination against employees because of their labor
affiliations or for any other unfair or unjust reason is barred."
Furthermore, Section 5a does not prohibit a closed shop agreement.
It says "nothing in this act shall prevent pursuing the vocation of
manual labor." But compulsory union membership does not prevent,
it merely qualifies employment.
There are a number of arguments in support of this second interpre-
tation. The first arises from a consideration of the legislative intent
lying behind these two sections.
The Congressional Record for June 8th (pages 5241, 5279, and
5290, Vol. 77, Part 6) seems to include the only references to the intent
of these sections made on the floors of the two houses. The latter part
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of Section 5a was written into the N.I.R.A. on the floor of the Senate
as an amendment by Senator Long. Previous to its introduction Sen-
ator Long had said, "XVe are going to get that regulation down to the
point that every little man that takes his water jug and ax across his
back and goes into the woods to hack cross ties is going to have to comply
with some rules and regulations and stand ready to have his license
revoked for not complying with the rules and regulations that are issued
governing the length and width and breadth and thickness and quan-
tity of cross ties. * * * And I will ask only one thing further. I will
ask that the Senator put in further that the President has not power to
revoke a laboring man's right to go ahead and pursue his vocation."
From Senator Long's statements it would appear that Section 5a
has no applicability to the rights of the driver salesmen in the principal
case.
As to Section 7a the Record reveals that a proviso suggested by the
committee having the Bill in charge (to the effect that nothing in this
section shall compel the changing of existing satisfactory relations
between employers and employees) had passed the Senate. Senator
Norris on the next day moved to strike this proviso from the Act. His
accompanying words (which were chiefly instrumental in accomplish-
ing this) throws some light on Section 7a.
"This particular provision in the bill-Section 7, reestablishes almost
in identical language of that Bill (Norris-LaGuardia anti-injunction
act 29 U.S.C.A. No. 101-I15) the right of employees to organize in
unions of their own * * *. I think the proviso a direct blow at
organized labor * * * Some honest people believe that there ought
to be no such thing as organized labor. If their view be the correct one
then we ought to strike out this whole section; but if we are proceeding
on modern theory * * * then we ought to provide that the laboring
men shall be permitted to organize in their own way without coercion,
without any influence from their direct employers and that they shall
be permitted to select representatives of their own choice to represent
them in controversies which they must continually meet with organized
wealth."
Senator Norris' words seem to indicate that Congress intended to
consolidate in a few words the right of labor to organize collectively
without interference. It was apparently injected into the act to give
congressional sanction to collective bargaining. In so many words Sen-
ator Norris states that this right is to provide them equal bargaining
power with organized wealth. It would seem that Congress in sanc-
tioning collective bargaining impliedly sanctioned the concrete methods
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which are drawn after it to make it effective. The logical sequel to
collective bargaining is the existence of a completely unionized shop.
It seems unlikely that Congress in this avowed attempt to help the cause
of organized labor would have given this right without giving, by impli-
cation, the necessary collateral rights to make the goal of equal bargain-
ing power a reality.
Senator Wagner's statement at the introduction of his Labor Dis-
putes Bill on February 28th bears out this contention. "The new legis-
lation which I am proposing does not dictate any policy as to the closed
union shop. That is the problem which labor must work out for itself.
But the Bill does make it clear that Section 7a was not intended to ban
the closed union shop and that Congress never intended to place em-
ployees in a worse condition than they were before the Recovery Act
was passed."
The second argument is the content of the executive order of Feb-
ruary Ist (Federal Trade & Industry, Vol. I, N.I.R.A., No. 5702)
and the Denver Tramway ruling of the National Labor Board decided
in harmony with this order. (Federal Trade & Industry, Vol. i, Cur-
rent Matter, No. 8055).
By this order elections of representatives are to be held whenever a
substantial number request such an election. After the election is held
the Board shall publish the names of those elected who are "thereby
designated to represent all the employees eligible to participate in such
an election for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection in relations with their employer." The purpose of this
order was to meet the' practical problem of an employer faced with a
number of factions each claiming the right to represent all his employees.
This executive order was issued to lay down a procedure for carrying
7a into effect. But it was issued within the limitations of Section 7a.
The result of this election procedure is a situation which the court in
the principal case declares to be illegal. For this order definitely em-
powers the selected representatives of the majority to represent all those
eligible to vote. Or in other words, this order gives clear sanction to a
saddling of the majority representation not only on unaffiliated em-
ployees but also on minority groups. It seems then that on this score
Section 7a should be interpreted to permit the closed shop.
The third argument centers around the second subsection of 7a.
This read in its first draft, "that no employee or anyone seeking employ-
ment shall be required as a condition of employment to join any labor
organization." But President Green of the American Federation of
Labor testifying before the House Committee on Ways and Means
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(H. R. 5664-73rd Congress, ist Session i i8) suggested the substi-
tution of the words company union €"to make clear and definite the real
meaning and purpose of this part of the act." To designate that mem-
bership in a company union is prohibited as a condition of employment
seems dearly to permit membership in an outside labor organization
as a condition of employment. Subsection I of 7a which contains the
controversial points on freedom of choice and interference seemingly
should be qualified in light of the positive language of subsection 2 which
has just been quoted.
The fourth argument concerns Section 7c. This section follows:
"The President shall so far as practicable afford every opportunity to
employers and employees in any trade or industry or subdivision thereof
-to establish by mutual agreement the standards as to maximum hours
-and such other conditions of employment as may be necessary in such
trade or industry or subdivision thereof to effectuate the policy of this
tide-and the standards established in such agreements when approved
by the President shall have the same effect as a code of fair competition
approved by the President."
Suppose that seventy per cent of the group draw up a certain agree-
ment laying down hours of employment, rules of work, and amount of
wages. This section seems to give the President the authority to facili-
tate the signing of such agreement by the representatives of the seventy
per cent with the employer. And it furthermore definitely says that
these agreements shall have the same effect as a code of fair competition.
The National Industrial Recovery Act gives the government power to
enforce the imposition of a code on a minority of employers (Sec. 3a).
By extending the same effect to agreements of employment it would
appear that the rights of the individual employees must similarly give
way to the rights of the majority. Once more it seems that subsection
7a ( i ) must be construed in the light of a following section.
The final argument arises from a projection of the cases decided
since the coming of Section 7a against the background of the law as it
existed previously in those same states.
In New Jersey we find that the chancery courts quite generally
before the N.R.A. held that the strike for the closed shop was outside
the "allowable area of economic conflict." It is unnecessary to state
their reasons. Typical of this approach is Gevas v. Greek Restaurant
IVcorkers Club, 99 N.J. Eq. 770 (1926).
In the light of this position it is not hard to understand Bayonne
Textile Corp. v. Zimerican Federation of Silk Workers, 114 N.J. Eq.
307, 168 At. 799 (933)1; and Lichtman & Sons v. Leather Work-
'This case was later reversed and the injunction modified to apply to intimidation
only. sx N.J. Eq. 504, ITZ At. ;SSz (1934).
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ers, 169 Ad. 498 (N.J. Eq.) (1933). These later cases seem to stress
mainly the illegality of the union's attempts to gain a labor monopoly for
their particular union. Since Section 7a does not in express language
permit the dosed shop it is not difficult to understand why the New
Jersey Courts have maintained their hostility toward the dosed shop.
On the other hand Fryns v. Fair Lawn Fur Dressing Co., 168
Ad. 862 (N.J. Eq.) (933) includes some dicta which one finds diffi-
cult to square with these other post N.I.R.A. cases in New Jersey.
"* * * but if they are not organized and in fact indifferent as to how
they shall be organized or the enterprise is just starting then the employer
may choose his union and require all his men to join it."
The decisions in the New York Court of Appeals had consistently
upheld the right to strike for a dosed shop previous to the N.I.R.A.
J. H. & S. Theatres v. Fay, 260 N.Y. 315 (1932); Stilwell Theatre,
Inc. v. Kaplan, 259 N.Y. 405 (1932); Exchange Bakery v. Rifkin,
245 N.Y. 26o (1927). The only two New York cases in point since
the N.I.R.A. have stated that the provisions of this act have made no
change in the law as the Court of Appeals has enunciated it. Rosen-
thaler Etlinger Co. v. Schossberg et al., 266 N.Y.S. 762 (933);
Buckingham Cafeteria, Inc. v. Meservich, S.C.N.Y. Federal Trade
and Industry, Vol. I, Current Matter, No. 80l4 (1933).
No cases on this issue were discovered in Wisconsin previous to the
N.I.R.A., but since then a circuit court in Wisconsin in Federation of
Labor v. Simplex Shoe Mfg. Co. (C.C. Wis., Oct. 13, 1933) U. S.
Law Week, October 3, 1933, index p. 137
, 
has inferentially upheld
the closed shop as legal-under Section 7a, for it granted an injunction
to the Wisconsin Federation of Labor against the company's interference
with their program of plant unionization. This survey of the cases in
point suggest the Janus-headed character of Section 7a. With its words
lacking precision as to the closed shop, legality or illegality will seemingly
be read in or denied on the basis of the precedent of the court.
The New Jersey courts have traditionally opposed the closed shop.
It is easy to understand, therefore, their decisions since N.I.R.A., which
have molded the equivocal language of Section 7a to coincide with their
previous decisions. The New York courts, on the other hand, have
established firmly the legality of the closed shop. It is just as easy to
appreciate their reading Section 7a so as to uphold their former position.
The court in the principal case, as a result of LaFrance Co. v. Elec-
trical Workers, supra, was faced with the same tradition as the New
York courts. It would seem therefore that like the New York courts it
should have interpreted Section 7a so as to perpetuate the legality of a
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strike for a dosed shop. Or in other words even after the advent of
N.I.R.A. and its much publicized Section 7a, a strike for a dosed shop
should continue to be legal in Ohio. WILLIAM K. THOMAS
USE OF THE INJUNCTION TO PREVENT BREACH OF CONTRACT
The Hamilton Tailoring Company, of Cincinnati, Ohio, is a corpo-
ration employing about two hundred and fifty employees, engaged in the
manufacture of clothing. Shortly after the N.I.R.A. was invalidated the
employees evinced dissatisfaction with their wages and working condi-
tions. While a strike was imminent the company presented to the em-
ployees a "contract of employment" which substantially all of them were
induced to sign. No agreement on the question of hours and wages
could be reached between the employer and the employees and on
October 2, 1935, the members of the Amalgamated Clothing Workers
Union within the shop, numbering about one hundred in all, voted to
strike. The company filed a petition in the Common Pleas Court of
Hamilton County for an injunction prohibiting the defendant union
from "doing any act calculated to cause any employee to breach his
contract of employment" and for other similar relief. The court denied
the injunction on the grounds that the defendants were engaged in a
legal strike and that the employment contract was void for want of
mutuality in that during the first six months of its duration the employer
had the right to terminate the same while an equivalent right was not
vested in the employee. Hamilton Tailoring Company v. Cincinnati
Joint Board of tmalgamated Clothing Workers of .4meica, et al., 4
Ohio Op. 295 (1936).
After this opinion was released but before the making of the journal
entry the company drew up other contracts with its employees abro-
gating the original ones and attempting to meet the objection of the
trial court by giving either party the right to terminate the agreement
on fifteen days' notice. The case was then taken on appeal to the
Appellate Court of the First District where the plaintiff company was
permitted over objection to file supplemental petitions setting forth the
new contract and alleging that the defendants had instituted a secondary
boycott against the plaintiff subsequent to the filing of the original peti-
tion in the lower court. The Appellate Court reversed the holding of
the trial court and enjoined all persuasion tending toward a breach of
those contracts. It held both contracts valid without comment upon the
law involved in the case. That court also granted a sweeping injunction
against the secondary boycott.
